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ABSTRACT
Recent audit and financial reporting quality research suggest that audit committee financial expertise is a crucial 
ingredient for high quality financial reports. However, Malaysian literature has reported no association between audit 
committee financial expertise and audit report timeliness. Using audit report lag, we examined whether Malaysian audit 
committee financial expertise is relevant for financial reporting timeliness. Using data from 2005 to 2011 from the top 
100 Malaysian companies and the fixed effects panel data approach, we find that audit committee financial expertise 
is not significantly associated with audit report lag proxies. We further examined this issue with the basic premise that 
audit committee independence enhances the role of audit committee financial expertise. However, the interaction between 
these mechanisms shows an insignificant association. Additional investigation reveals that these results are driven by the 
lack of independence on Malaysian boards. We also find evidence suggesting that neither a large number of subsidiaries 
nor the quality of financial reporting sufficiently justify the recent Malaysian reforms relating to the financial reporting 
timeframe.    
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INTRODUCTION
Many studies have shown that audit report timeliness is 
crucial because it is associated with public confidence in 
the audited financial statements (Ettredge, Sun & Li 2006) 
and leads to adverse consequences if delayed (Carmichael, 
Ghosh & Lee 2011; Mande & Son 2011). Indeed, most 
prior Malaysian studies (e.g. Che-Ahmad & Abidin 2008; 
Mohamad-Nor, Shafie & Wan-Hussin 2010; Wan-Hussin 
& Bamahros 2013) assert that audit report timeliness in 
Malaysia significantly lags behind developed countries, 
such as the US, and some developing countries, such 
as Egypt, Oman and Bahrain. Although the World Bank 
(2012) had indicated that Bursa Malaysia had conducted a 
consultation process with other stakeholders to shorten the 
timeframe for audited financial statements, i.e. from four 
months to two months, Bursa Malaysia has disregarded 
this intention and only reduced the timeframe for annual 
reports from six months to five months with effect from 31 
December 2014, and then to four months with effect from 
31 December 2015. According to Dato’ Tajuddin Atan, 
the CEO of Bursa Malaysia Berhad, the recent changes are 
sufficient to improve the timeliness in the Bursa and that 
the timeframe is similar to other markets (Bursa Malaysia 
2013). 
 The objective of this study is to examine the 
association between audit committee financial expertise 
and audit report lag. The motivation for this study stems 
from recent research that investigates the effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms on the timeliness of 
audit reports (e.g. Abdullah 2006; Afify 2009; Puasa, Salleh 
& Ahmad 2014; Abernathy, Beyer, Masli, & Stefaniak 
2014; Baatwah, Salleh & Ahmad 2015b; Knechel, Sharma, 
& Sharma 2012; Sultana, Singh & Van der Zahn 2015). 
In addition to investigating various corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as the board of directors and audit 
committee characteristics, previous research had also 
provided emphasis on the audit committee financial 
expertise since discharging audit committee responsibilities 
require directors with extensive financial knowledge and 
experience (Bédard, Chtourou & Courteau 2004). Most 
prior empirical evidence assumes that audit committee 
financial expertise would enhance the timeliness of audit 
reports since fewer errors in annual accounts are made, 
thus requiring less audit work. Although audit committee 
financial expertise has long been recognized as an 
important audit committee characteristic (Klein 2002; Xie, 
Davidson & DaDalt 2003), a large number of Malaysian 
research on audit committee financial expertise and audit 
report lag has failed to find a significant association (Ismail, 
Mustapha & Ming 2012; Mohamad-Nor et al. 2010; Nelson 
& Shukeri 2011; Shukeri & Islam 2012; Wan-Hussin & 
Bamahros 2013). 
 The hesitation of Bursa Malaysia to reduce the 
timeframe of audited financial statements to two months 
may be the main reason that the previous research did not 
find any significant association between audit committee 
financial expertise and audit report lag, even though the 
motivation for requiring companies in Malaysia to appoint 
a financial expert on the audit committee is to enhance the 
timeliness of financial reporting.  We argue that the results 
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of prior research have suffered from bias because important 
variables were omitted and no elaboration were given as to 
why audit committee financial expertise was not associated 
with audit report lag. Wan-Hussin and Bamahros (2013) 
has even suggested that most Malaysian research on audit 
report lag is biased because it suffers from the omission of 
crucial variables. While they acknowledge that the study 
of Che-Ahmad and Abidin (2008) is comprehensive, they 
contend that it fails to consider corporate governance 
variables.
 Similarly, while we acknowledge Wan-Hussin and 
Bamahros (2013) as a more recent and comprehensive 
study that explores the contributing factors of audit report 
lag in Malaysia, this study has also omitted important 
variables, such as the specific effect variables and board 
variables that may have resulted in bias in some reported 
results. For example, prior literature (see Dyer & McHugh 
1975; Khlif & Samaha 2014) finds that adjustment, closing 
annual accounts and audit work, which are time-invariant, 
are the most important factors that cause delay in issuing 
the audit report. Although the required audit work can be 
proxied by some observable variables (Bamber, Bamber, 
& Schoderbek 1993), adjustment and closing annual 
accounts are not publicly observable, and companies take a 
different amount of time to adjust and close their accounts 
(Davies & Whittred 1980). In addition, it has ignored 
the effect of the corporate governance reforms made 
by Bursa Malaysia in 2007 concerning audit committee 
composition. Furthermore, prior research fails to control 
the effect of board characteristics on the effectiveness of 
audit committee characteristics (Rainsbury, Bradbury & 
Steven 2008; Sharma, Naiker & Lee 2009). Thus, our 
study addresses all these concerns by using the panel data 
method and controlling more variables relating to corporate 
governance and to audit report timelines.
 Apart from the omission of certain variables, 
evidences from Malaysian literature on audit committee 
financial expertise and audit report lag does not imply 
that audit committee financial expertise is ineffective 
in providing timely audit reports. However, we argue 
that prior literature has ignored the interaction between 
audit committee financial expertise and independence all 
together. 
 Malaysian regulators have stipulated that audit 
committees must have at least one director with an 
accounting expertise. However, although initially 
Malaysian corporate governance reforms did not prohibit 
executive directors from being present on the committee, 
subsequently, these reforms require that the committees are 
exclusively composed of non-executive directors, with a 
majority being independent directors. 
 Prior audit committee literature shows that audit 
committee independence affects the effectiveness of the 
audit committee (Bronson, Carcello, Hollingsworth & 
Neal 2009). In addition, audit committee financial experts 
are more effective when they are independent (Dhaliwal, 
Naiker & Navissi 2010; Sharma & Kuang 2014). In a 
setting with full audit committee independence, Abernathy 
et al. (2014) and Baatwah et al. (2015b) reported that audit 
committee financial expertise is associated with short audit 
report lag, while Baatwah, Salleh, and Ahmad (2013) 
contend that audit committee independence contributes 
to the effectiveness of audit committee financial expertise. 
Thus, we argue that in settings with lenient requirements 
for audit committee independence, it is important to 
consider the interaction between audit committee financial 
expertise and audit committee independence.
 Using 676 observations made and the fixed effects 
panel data approach, we find evidences consistent with 
prior Malaysian literature suggesting that audit committee 
financial expertise is not associated with short audit report 
lag. We also find that audit committee independence has 
an insignificant association with audit report lag. When 
audit committee financial expertise is associated with its 
independence, the insignificant association still persists. 
Further tests suggest that if the board has a large number 
of independent directors, the audit committee financial 
expertise and independence significantly enhance the 
timeliness of audit reports. Further analysis also reports 
that companies with a large number of subsidiaries are not 
the main constraint for auditors in providing timely audit 
reports, and that financial reporting quality is not threatened 
by short audit report lag. 
 Our study contributes to the literature pertaining 
to corporate governance and audit report timeliness in 
two ways. First, we explored the effectiveness of the 
interaction between audit committee financial expertise 
and the independence of the board and audit committee in 
improving the timeliness of audit reports. Second, for the 
Malaysian literature, audit committee financial expertise 
is significantly associated with improved audit report 
timeliness, albeit the lack of independence on Malaysian 
boards which undermines this role. As for policymakers, 
our study contains important implications for Malaysian 
regulators and companies in relation to how the timeliness 
of financial reporting and corporate governance can be 
enhanced.
 The paper proceeds as follows. The subsequent 
section is a review of prior literature and develops the 
study hypotheses. Section four details the research design. 
This is followed by the empirical results section, while the 
conclusion is presented in the final section.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
AUDIT REPORT LAG
The audit report lag is defined as the time in days that 
lapse between the year-end and the date of signing the 
audit report (Davies & Whittred 1980; Dyer & McHugh 
1975). Prior literature indicates that a shorter time for 
audit reports is associated with manifold advantages 
(Wan-Hussin & Bamahros 2013). From this, a significant 
amount of research investigating the factors explaining 
audit report lag from developed and developing countries 
emerged (e.g. Abbott, Parker & Peters 2012; Ashton, 
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Willingham & Elliott 1987; Bamber et al. 1993; Carslaw 
& Kaplan 1991; Ettredge et al. 2006; Leventis, Weetman 
& Caramanis 2005). This literature has identified and 
discovered that audit report lag is affected by company 
and auditor related factors, such as company size, audit 
complexity, leverage, performance, auditor type, industry 
type, and so on. It appears that  a growing number of 
studies have examined and reported a link between 
corporate governance mechanisms and audit report lag (see 
Abernathy et al. 2014; Afify 2009; Baatwah et al. 2015b; 
Knechel et al. 2012).
 Like other markets, research conducted in Malaysia 
has also recognized the importance of audit report 
lag; since 2000 more research began exploring and 
explaining related factors (e.g. Ahmad & Kamarudin 
2003). Although Malaysian regulators and practitioners 
emphasize a shorter audit report lag, research has found 
that auditors in Malaysian companies usually take 100 to 
115 days to finalize and issue an audit report. This time 
is comparatively longer than the reported time in other 
countries; for example, in the US they take between 40 
to 50 days (Bamber et al. 1993; Ettredge et al. 2006); in 
New Zealand, 61 days (Habib & Bhuiyan 2011); in Egypt, 
67 days (Afify 2009); in Oman, 51 days (Baatwah et al. 
2015b); and in Bahrain, 48 days (Al-Ajmi 2008). Indeed, 
the timeframe for the audited financial statements in most 
countries falls between 60 and 90 days. As such, we believe 
that the Malaysian timeframe is one of the reasons for 
discouraging companies and their auditors from providing 
more timely information.         
 Insights into the Malaysian empirical evidence 
suggest that there are two streams of literature. One stream 
exclusively examines the effect of the company and auditor 
specific factors on audit report lag (see Abidin & Ahmad-
Zaluki 2012; Ahmad & Kamarudin 2003; Che-Ahmad & 
Abidin 2008; Yaacob & Che-Ahmad 2012). This research 
documents the significant effect of these factors on the 
audit report lag. Although this stream of literature considers 
the important variables within the audit report lag model, 
it fails to find consistent results, nor does it consider the 
recent development of the audit report lag literature. The 
other stream mainly focuses on the effect of corporate 
governance (see Abdullah 2006; Ishak, Sidek & Rashid 
2010; Ismail et al. 2012; Mohamad-Nor et al. 2010; Nelson 
& Shukeri 2011; Wan-Hussin & Bamahros 2013; Puasa et 
al. 2014). Although this stream of research suffers from 
significant flaws relating to the methodology, it provides an 
insight into recent developments in the literature pertaining 
to audit report lag. It finds that audit report lag is affected 
by board characteristics, audit committee characteristics 
and ownership characteristics. However, this literature 
reports that audit committee financial expertise has little 
effect on audit report lag. 
 Building on this literature and its shortages, we 
examine the association between audit committee financial 
expertise and audit report lag using the two-way fixed 
effects panel data model to control for unobservable and 
time specific effects, and, simultaneously, incorporate 
board and audit committee characteristics. The following is 
a review of the prior literature on audit committee financial 
expertise. 
AUDIT COMMITTEE FINANCIAL EXPERTISE
Prior literature has argued that audit committees are an 
important part of the decision control system for internal 
monitoring by the board of directors (Fama 1980; Fama 
& Jensen 1983). They identified a number of audit 
committee responsibilities that mainly focus on enhancing 
company performance and shareholders’ wealth (see Blue 
Ribbon Committee (BRC) 1999; DeZoort, Hermanson, 
Archambeault & Reed 2002). However, previous literature 
posits that the responsibilities of the audit committee 
cannot be easily discharged unless such committees 
have independent directors with relevant expertise, in 
support with Kalbers and Fogary (1993) who suggested 
that audit committee expertise enhances the power of the 
audit committee, and, in turn, produces quality financial 
reporting. Bédard et al. (2004), on the other hand, suggest 
that the financial reporting process is the main audit 
committee’s responsibility and that this responsibility can 
be accomplished through directors who have extensive 
financial knowledge and experience.
 Consequently, many researchers have investigated 
the influence of audit committee financial expertise on 
a variety of financial reporting quality and audit quality 
measures. For example, McMullen and Raghunandan 
(1996) report that companies with financial problems are 
unlikely to have audit committee members with financial 
expertise. Subsequent studies (e.g. Abbott, Parker, Peters & 
Raghunandan 2003; Xie et al. 2003) report the significant 
positive influence of audit committee financial expertise on 
the quality of financial reporting and audit quality. Recent 
evidences from this literature show that the positive impact 
of directors with financial expertise on financial reporting 
quality is exclusively attributed to accounting and auditing 
expertise and not to other financial expertise (e.g. Dhaliwal 
et al. 2010; Goh 2009; Krishnan & Visvanathan 2008). 
With regard to the Malaysian evidence, it is found that audit 
committee financial expertise is significantly associated 
with greater demand for high audit quality (Yatim, Kent, 
& Clarkson 2006), high quality earnings management 
(Nelson & Devi 2013; Saleh, Iskandar & Rahmat 2007), 
healthy financial performance (Rahmat, Iskandar & Saleh 
2009), voluntary disclosure (Akhtaruddin & Haron 2010), 
less quarterly financial reporting restatements (Ismail & 
Rahman 2011), and effectively mediating the auditor-client 
disputes (Salleh & Stewart 2012).
 This study focuses on the effect of audit committee 
financial expertise on audit report lag. A wide range 
of prior literature posits that audit committee financial 
expertise is linked with timely audit reports (e.g. Knechel 
et al. 2012; Mohamad-Nor et al. 2010). However, as the 
aforementioned literature does not specifically explain 
how it can shorten audit report lag, we conjecture that 
audit committee financial expertise leads to a short audit 
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report lag in terms of its effect on (1) year-end accounts 
closing and adjustment; (2) audit work; and (3) auditor-
client adjustment negotiation. Findings by Dyer and 
McHugh (1975) show that these components consumed 
37%, 48% and 14% respectively of the total period of year-
end audit function. Furthermore, since audit committee 
financial expertise is associated with less intentional and 
unintentional errors in accounts (Dhaliwal et al. 2010), 
reduced audit risk and effort (Yatim et al. 2006) and 
reduced auditor-client disputes (Salleh & Stewart 2012), 
the audit report lag is shorter. Supporting this argument, 
Abernathy et al. (2014) found that the presence and high 
proportion of accounting expertise on audit committees is 
associated with timelier audit reports for US companies. 
Baatwah et al. (2015b) and Sultana et al. (2015) also found 
that audit committees with financial expertise resulted in 
reduced audit report lag.
 As noted earlier, Malaysian empirical evidence 
contradicts this expectation and reports that audit report 
lag is not significantly explained by audit committee 
financial expertise (e.g. Mohamad-Nor et al. 2010; Wan-
Hussin & Bamahros 2013). These results challenge the 
expectation and requirement of Bursa Malaysia in respect 
to the presence of financial experts on the audit committee. 
Given the paucity of evidence supporting the preceding 
arguments, and given the absence of evidence using 
Malaysian data suggesting a significant link between audit 
committee financial expertise and audit report lag, we pose 
the following hypothesis:
H1: Audit committee financial expertise is associated with 
audit report lag.  
 We argue that the unexpected results concerning the 
association between audit committee financial expertise 
and audit report lag for Malaysian data are explained 
by the omission of interaction between audit committee 
financial expertise and independence. This is consistent 
with Abdullah, Yusof, and Mohamad-Nor (2010) and 
Baatwah et al. (2013) who anticipated an interaction 
between audit committee independence and expertise in 
ensuring audit committee effectiveness. It is widely known 
among authoritative bodies, practitioners and researchers 
that audit committee independence constitutes a crucial 
mechanism for ensuring the effective monitoring of 
audit committees (Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) 1999; 
DeZoort et al. 2002). Fama and Jensen (1983) had indicated 
that independent directors are needed for the effective 
monitoring function of the board’s committees by the audit 
committee. Further, McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) 
claimed that independent directors on the audit committee 
do not hesitate to question management’s actions and 
policies. Prior empirical evidence supports this claim and 
reports that audit committee independence is associated 
with high quality financial reporting (e.g. Bédard et al. 
2004; Dhaliwal et al. 2010; Klein 2002). Using Malaysian 
data, it is shown that companies with audit committees that 
comprise a high proportion of independent directors or that 
are fully independent have high quality accruals (Saleh et 
al. 2007), performance (Ameer, Ramli & Zakaria 2009), 
and level of voluntary disclosure (Akhtaruddin & Haron 
2010).
 Prior to revising the Malaysian code on corporate 
governance in 2007, executive directors were allowed to be 
present on the audit committee. Such directors might hinder 
the audit committee from performing its role effectively 
and raise the external auditor’s concern about the internal 
control quality (Abdullah et al. 2010). By using the pre 
revision sample, Abdullah (2006) and Mohamad-Nor et 
al. (2010) found that audit committee independence is 
not associated with timely audit report. In contrast, for 
companies listed in 2009, Wan-Hussin and Bamahros 
(2013) reported timely audit reports for audit committees 
with high proportion of independent directors. 
 Based on prior Malaysian results concerning the effect 
of audit committee financial expertise on audit report 
lag, we posit that audit committee financial expertise is 
not enough to discipline the managers from committing 
intentional and unintentional errors, and signaling the 
quality of control to external auditors. Thus, we expect 
that audit committee independence will enhance the 
role of financial expertise in audit report lag because an 
independent audit committee will further increase the 
integrity of the managers and reduce audit risk. This is 
consistent with Dhaliwal et al. (2010), and Sharma and 
Iselin (2012) who, respectively, reported that independent 
audit committee financial experts are associated with high 
quality accruals and less occurrence of financial reporting 
misstatements. Thus, we propose the following interaction 
hypothesis:
H2: The association between audit committee financial 
expertise and audit report timeliness is significantly 
moderated by the audit committee independence.
RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA
DATA
Our sample selection process began with the top 100 
Malaysian listed companies in 2011. The main reason for 
selecting these companies is that they have achieved a 
high level of compliance with corporate governance best 
practices, quality of disclosure, financial sustainability, 
and corporate responsibility efforts. Furthermore, these 
companies constitute 69% of the total market capitalization 
of all Malaysian public listed companies in 2011 (Minority 
Shareholder Watchdog Group 2011). In selecting these 
companies as the initial sample, we traced data for these 
companies over the period of 2005 to 2011, resulting in 700 
observations as the initial sample. One crucial criterion in 
our sample selection process is that a company must have 
data for at least two years to achieve the requirement of 
applying the panel data method. Within the study period, 
our sample companies have at least three years’ worth of 
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data with the majority having seven years’ worth of data. 
Thus, 676 observations for our empirical evidence were 
considered. Our sample period selection is based on the fact 
that it is for the period of five years after the introduction of 
the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance and extends 
four years after its first revision. This period of time can 
ensure more compliance and effective implementation of 
the provisions in the code by Malaysian companies. Data 
were collected for the sample companies from Malaysian 
capital market websites, company annual reports and the 
OSIRIS database.
ESTIMATION METHOD
This study first examined the direct association between 
audit committee financial expertise and audit report lag, 
and then examines the association after considering the 
interaction between audit committee financial expertise 
and independence. We used the fixed effects panel data 
method to provide the empirical results. Prior literature 
has documented that panel data methods are effective in 
controlling for omitted time invariant and specific time 
variables, in general (Baltagi 2008), and in analyzing 
audit report lag, in particular (Henderson & Kaplan 2000). 
Furthermore, we employed two proxies—audit report lag 
and industry-adjusted audit report lag—for audit report 
lag. These proxies (audit report lag) are consistent with 
most prior literature (e.g. Ashton et al. 1987; Bamber et 
al. 1993) and perform (industry-adjusted audit report lag) 
more effectively in controlling industry influence on audit 
report lag (Baatwah, Salleh, & Ahmad 2015a). Based on 
this method, we ran the following models:
 ARLit (or IAARLit) = βi + β1ACAEXit + β2ACIDit 
(or FACIDit) + β3ACSZit + β4ACMit + β5BIDit + 
β6BSZit + β7BOMit + β8FNCONDit + β9OWCOit 
+ β
10
SUBit + β11INVRCEVit + β12EXTORDit + 
β
13
LOSSit + β14COSZit + β15NEWSit + β16LNCOAGit 
+ β
17
OPINIONit + β18ADFSZit + β19ADFTit + 
β
20
ADFEEit + β21NADFEEit + β22-27YEARDUMit + εit     
 (1)
 ARLit (or IAARLit) = βi + β1ACAEXit + β2ACIDit 
(or FACIDit) + β3ACAEXit*ACIDit (or FACIDit) 
+ β4ACSZit + β5ACMit + β6BIDit + β7BSZit + 
β8BOMit + β9FNCONDit + β10OWCOit + β11SUBit 
+ β
12
INVRCEVit + β13EXTORDit + β14LOSSit 
+ + β
15
LNCOSZit + β16NEWSit + β17LNCOAGit 
+ β
18
OPINIONit + β19ADFSZit + β20ADFTit + 
β
21
ADFEEit + β22NADFEEit + β23-28YEARDUMit + εit     
(2)
 We define our interested variables as follows. For the 
dependent variables, audit report lag (ARL) is the number 
of days between the year-end and the date of the auditor 
report signature, while industry-adjustment audit report lag 
(IAARL) is the difference between the median of audit report 
lag for a given industry and audit report lag for a focal 
company from the same industry. As for audit committee 
financial expertise (ACAEX), we adhered to the definition 
provided by Bursa Malaysia and the most recent audit 
committee financial expertise literature (e.g. Dhaliwal et 
al. 2010; Sharma & Iselin 2012) that considers a director 
with a qualification and experience in accounting as the 
only relevant financial expertise to the audit committee. 
We operationalized this variable as the proportion of 
accounting expertise on the audit committee. For audit 
committee independence, we used the proportion of 
independent directors on the audit committee (ACID) and 
full audit committee independence (FACID).
 For the control variables, we controlled for a set of 
variables relating to corporate governance, audit risk, 
audit complicity, timely reporting incentives and auditor 
characteristics. These factors have been shown to influence 
the audit report lag (e.g. Ashton et al. 1987; Bamber et 
al. 1993; Carslaw & Kaplan 1991; Knechel et al. 2012; 
Leventis et al. 2005; Wan-Hussin & Bamahros 2013). 
Thus, controlling these variables can eliminate the threat of 
omitting important variables and enhance the productivity 
of our models. Indeed, most of this literature have predicted 
a positive association between audit risk, audit complexity 
variables and audit report lag. On the other hand, it has 
also assumed a negative relationship between corporate 
governance, timely reporting incentives and auditor 
characteristics, and audit report lag.
 The definition of all the variables included in our 
analysis is shown in Table 11.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Table 2 shows a comprehensive descriptive statistics for 
the study sample and variables of interest. Panel A of this 
Table shows that our sample includes companies with 
different industry classification, and that companies from 
the manufacturing and finance industries represent the 
largest number in our sample, which are 29% and 22%, 
respectively. It also shows that, on average, most industries 
have an audit report lag (ARL) of between 65 and 89 days, 
thereby indicating that introducing a reduction in the 
timeframe of the audited financial statement would not 
burden most industries. As for the variables of interest, 
it is shown that wholesale trade industry is ranked as the 
highest in terms of financial expertise and independent 
directors on the audit committee, followed by financial 
industry in terms of audit committee financial expertise, 
and construction industry in terms of audit committee 
independence. In this Table, Panel B shows the means 
of interested variables for each year and suggests an 
improvement in ARL, ACAEX, ACID and FACID from year 
to year indicating that it is possible to observe a difficulty 
in complying with any reforms in the initial years.    
 Panel C of Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics 
for the study variables over a sample period (i.e. 2005-
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TABLE 1. Definition of variables 
Variable Measurement of variable 
ARL
IAARL
ACAEX
ACID
FACID
ACSZ
ACM
BID
BSZ
BOM
FNCOND
OWCO
SUB
INVRCEV
EXTORD
LOSS
COSZ
NEWS
LNCOAG
OPINION
ADFSZ
ADFT
ADFEE
NADFEE
The number of days between the company year-end and the audit report date.
The difference between ARL and the median of ARL for a given industry.
The proportion of directors on the AC with accounting expertise.
The proportion of independent directors on the AC.
1 if the AC has full independent directors, 0 otherwise.
The number of directors on the AC.
The number of meetings held by the AC during the year.
The proportion of independent directors on the board.
The number of directors on the board.
The number of meetings held by the board during the year.
The Zmijewski model for financial distressed companies. 
The percentage of company shares held by substantial shareholders (>=5%).
The number of company principle subsidiaries.
The proportion of the inventory and receivable accounting to total assets.
1 if the company reported extraordinary items, 0 otherwise. 
1 if the company reported a loss for the current year, 0 otherwise. 
The natural log of total assets.
The difference between current EPS and prior EPS scaled by prior EPS.
The natural log of the number of years since the company was incorporated.
1 if the auditor issued qualified audit report, 0 otherwise.
1 if the audit firm is Big 4, 0 otherwise.                   
The number of consecutive years that the external auditor is appointed as the external auditor for the company.
The natural log of statuary audit fees.
The natural log of non-audit fees paid to the external auditor.
2011). Our descriptive discussion focuses on the variables 
of interest. Thus, the descriptive statistics for the other 
variables can be seen in Panel C. It reports that the mean 
(median) of ARL is 77 (74) days. This result is contrary to 
most Malaysian evidence (e.g. Nelson & Shukeri 2011; 
Wan-Hussin & Bamahros 2013) that shows that, on 
average, Malaysian auditors take more than 100 days to 
finalize the year-end audit function, which suggests that 
a large number of Malaysian companies are prepared for 
a greater reduction in the timeframe for disclosure. This 
result is comparable with US empirical evidence (e.g. 
Abbott et al. 2012; Ettredge et al. 2006). As for IAARL, 
the average is 3 (0) days, which suggests that Malaysian 
companies deviate from the industry audit report lag by 
an additional 3 days. As for interested audit committee 
variables, it is shown that ACAEX is, on average, 39% 
(33%). The mean (median) for ACID is found to be 85% 
(80%). As for FACID, it is reported that 48% of our sample 
has formed an audit committee with full independence. 
 Table 3 is the results gauging the effect of 
multicollinearity on our estimations. We observe that 
none of the variables in our analysis has a variance inflation 
factor (VIF) exceeding the normal value indicating that a 
multicollinearity problem does not threaten our empirical 
analysis Untabulated results of correlation matrix also 
indicate no. univariate correlation between two variables 
higher than 0.80 suggesting that multicollinearity is not a 
concern (Gujarati 2009). We wish to highlight that COSZ 
and ADFEE have VIF around 5.5 which is higher than other 
variables. However, we ran our models after excluding 
one of these variables, and found that the results for our 
interested variables are quantitatively similar to the main 
results.
REGRESSION RESULTS
Table 3 and Table 4 present the results for Equations (1) and 
(2), with ARL (columns 4 and 5) and IAARL (columns 6 and 
7) as the dependent variables. To ensure the efficiency of 
our estimations, we winsorized all the continuous variables 
at the level 1% percentile and 99% percentile to reduce 
the effect of outliers, and we used robust standard error to 
reduce the effect of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
problems since Modified Wald test and Wooldridge test 
indicate the presence of these problems. The results for the 
control variables are largely consistent with prior studies, 
except for ADFSZ and ADFT which have a significant and 
positive association with ARL and IAARL. 2 Our concern is 
the association between audit committee financial expertise 
and audit report lag. Thus, we only discuss and deliberate 
the results related to this concern. 
 The results indicate that the coefficients of ACAEX are 
insignificantly associated with ARL and IAARL (p>.10), 
which is consistent with prior Malaysian evidence 
(Mohamad-Nor et al. 2010; Wan-Hussin & Bamahros 
2013). This further supports our contention suggesting 
that, by itself, Malaysian audit committee financial 
expertise is unable to ensure timely audit reports, and 
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TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Sample distribution and means for interested variables for each industry
Variable No.Obs % ARL ACAEX ACID FACID
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation and Utilities
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
Services
81
30
47
199
86
7
28
146
52
12%
4%
7%
29%
13%
1%
4%
22%
8%
73.82
106.70
85.38
81.23
65.67
114.29
65.86
68.84
88.65
0.38
0.30
0.38
0.34
0.43
0.48
0.36
0.46
0.40
0.86
0.92
0.93
0.86
0.81
1.00
0.79
0.82
0.85
0.49
0.70
0.77
0.51
0.33
1.00
0.29
0.39
0.50
Total 676 100% 77.38 0.39 0.85 0.48
Panel B: Means for interested variables for each year
Variable 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
ARL
ACAEX
ACID
FACID
 79.01
0.35
0.77
0.22
77.93
0.37
0.78  
0.23
76.64
0.37
0.81
0.36
77.01
0.39
0.87
0.54
76.71
0.41  
0.88
0.60
77.47
0.41
0.91
0.69
77.04
0.43
0.91
0.67
Panel C: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean S.D. 0.25 0.50 0.75
ARL
IAARL
ACAEX
ACID
FACID
ACSZ
ACM
BID
BSZ
BOM
FNCOND
OWCO (%)
SUB
INVRCEV
EXTORD
LOSS
COSZ (RM000)
COSZ
NEWS
LNCOAG
OPINION
ADFSZ
ADFT
ADFEE (RM000)
ADFEE
NADFEE (RM000)
NADFEE
77.38
2.760
0.390
0.850
0.480
3.630
5.590
0.500
8.180
6.790
-2.050
52.15
35.98
0.230
0.520
0.040
16000000
21.65
1.540
3.250
0.010
0.900
6.720
990.0
12.96
450.0
10.78
26.02
24.49
0.190
0.150
0.500
0.760
2.530
0.140
1.940
3.370
1.510
19.38
44.06
0.170
0.500
0.200
45000000
1.761
31.96
0.740
0.080
0.300
2.970
2000
1.218
1100
3.439
56.00
-10.75
0.250
0.750
0.000
3.000
4.000
0.400
7.000
4.000
-3.060
37.82
7.000
0.080
0.000
0.000
81000000
20.51
-4.150
2.830
0.000
1.000
5.000
180.0
12.08
21.00
9.952
74.00
0.000
0.330
0.800
0.000
3.000
5.000
0.500
8.000
6.000
-2.190
54.74
24.50
0.190
1.000
0.000
190000000
21.36
2.000
3.430
0.000
1.000
7.000
350.0
12.75
97.00
11.48
102.0
20.00
0.500
1.000
1.000
4.000
6.000
0.570
9.000
8.000
-1.210
67.03
47.00
0.330
1.000
0.000
670000000
22.62
8.770
3.740
0.000
1.000
9.00
9300
13.74
300.0
12.63
COSZ (RM000), ADFEE (RM000) and NADFEE (RM000) are total assets, total audit fees and total non-audit services measured in amounts. See Table 1 for definition 
of variables.
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TABLE 3. Regression results
Variable VIF Exp. Sign ARL ARL IAARL IAARL
Coef/ t.stat Coef/ t.stat Coef/ t.stat Coef/ t.stat
ACAEX
ACID
FACID
ACSZ
ACM
BID
BSZ
BOM
FNCOND
OWCO
SUB
INVRCEV
EXTORD
LOSS
COSZ
NEWS
LNCOAG
OPINION
ADFSZ
ADFT
ADFEE
NADFEE
1.20
1.44
1.46
1.34
1.98
1.56
1.44
2.41
2.27
1.20
2.49
1.21
1.20
1.15
5.49
1.08
1.40
1.01
1.19
1.28
5.53
1.30
?
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
+
-
+
+
+
+
-
-
-
+
-
-
?
_
5.521
-3.224
-1.181***
-0.443
1.393
0.170
0.198
0.891***
-0.184***
0.034**
-1.846
4.166***
4.642***
0.391
-0.001
-10.722**
6.145**
5.399**
0.324*
0.743
-0.419***
5.465
-1.469
-1.377***
-0.449
1.789
0.181
0.194
0.871***
-0.185***
0.036**
-2.087
4.138***
4.592***
0.433
-0.001
-10.808**
6.295**
5.487**
0.327*
0.678
-0.422***
6.035
-2.102
-1.120***
-0.403
1.458
0.174
0.166
0.695***
-0.148***
0.036**
0.250
4.633***
5.052***
0.311
-0.001
-15.311***
5.978**
5.541***
0.313*
1.213
-0.426***
5.961
-1.212
-1.317***
-0.411
2.014
0.191
0.161
0.679***
-0.149***
0.037**
0.001
4.600***
4.993***
0.363
-0.001
-15.346***
6.115**
5.608***
0.315*
1.148
-0.428***
YEARDUM Included
_cons 104.9*** 103.4*** 36.10*** 56.19***
N
R2
Adj R2
T-stat
676
0.089
0.050
0.000
676
0.091
0.053
0.000
676
0.096
0.055
0.000
676
0.097
0.056
0.000
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01
See Table 1 for definition of variables 
that it needs more support to ensure the contribution of 
audit committee financial expertise. Thus, we contend 
that audit committee independence can enhance the role 
of financial expertise in attaining a short audit report lag. 
In this regard, we report and discuss the results for the 
audit committee independence and audit report timeliness 
proxies. We should report that the coefficient of ACAEX 
is positive which is contradictory to previous Malaysian 
evidence (e.g. Mohamad-Nor et al. 2010; Wan-Hussin & 
Bamahros 2013). One possible explanation for such result 
is that in our sample, audit committee financial expertise 
is highly exposed to risk in accounting irregularities cases 
since our sample includes the largest listed companies in 
Malaysian Bursa. As such these directors are concerned 
more with the risk than other directors are (Krishnan & 
Visvanathan 2008) and so have greater incentivies to 
reduce this risk by conducting a more detailed review and 
investigation of accounting irregularties and discussing 
different accounting issues in detail with the auditor and 
other related parties. Such process may lead to a longer 
period required to prepare the annual reports for auditing 
and time has been extended for the auditor to complete the 
audit.
 Using the proportion and full audit committee 
independence, it is reported that ACID and FACID are 
negatively but insignificantly associated with ARL and 
IAARL (p>.10). This result is contradictory to Wan-Hussin 
and Bamahros (2013) who found a negative and significant 
association. We believe that our results are reliable because 
the sample of this study has allowed us to control the effect 
of recent revisions in the code on corporate governance that 
had brought a significant improvement to the Malaysian 
corporate governance practices, particularly audit 
committee independence. Thus, it suggests that the results 
of prior research relating to audit committee independence 
and audit report lag are endogenously determined by a time 
specific effect. 
 Having reported no significant association between 
audit committee financial expertise and audit report 
timeliness, we tested whether including more independent 
directors on the audit committee enhances the role of audit 
committee financial expertise. We employed the interaction 
approach to examine this interest by multiplying ACAEX 
with ACID and FACID. After standardizing the components 
of the interaction terms ACAEX, ACID and FACID, it is shown 
that the interaction terms of ACAEX*ACID and ACAEX*FACID 
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TABLE 4. Interaction analysis
Variable Exp. Sign ARL ARL IAARL IAARL
Coef/t.stat Coef/t.stat Coef/t.stat Coef/t.stat
ACAEX
ACID
FACID
ACAEX*ACID
ACAEX*FACID
ACSZ
ACM
BID
BSZ
BOM
FNCOND
OWCO
SUB
INVRCEV
EXTORD
LOSS
COSZ
NEWS
LNCOAG
OPINION
ADFSZ
ADFT
ADFEE
NADFEE
?
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
+
-
+
+
+
+
-
-
-
+
-
-
?
-
1.059
-0.513
0.651
-1.247***
-0.438
1.827
0.139
0.219
0.924***
-0.188***
0.034**
-1.342
4.003***
4.713***
0.346
-0.001
-10.655**
6.181**
5.393**
0.346**
0.979
-0.444***
0.563
-1.389
1.025
-1.437***
-0.446
2.057
0.168
0.199
0.895***
-0.179***
0.035**
-1.712
4.038***
4.672***
0.401
-0.001
-10.817**
6.257**
5.532**
0.349**
0.871
-0.440***
1.158
-0.346
0.664
-1.189***
-0.398
1.902
0.142
0.188
0.729***
-0.142***
0.036**
0.764
4.466***
5.124***
0.266
-0.001
-15.242**
6.015**
5.534***
0.335**
1.454
-0.451***
0.634
-1.233
1.075
-1.381***
-0.407
2.294
0.177
0.167
0.705***
-0.144***
0.036**
0.399
4.496***
5.076***
0.329
-0.001
-15.355***
6.075**
5.654***
0.338**
1.350
-0.447***
YEARDUM Included
_cons 102.0*** 103.7*** 34.30*** 35.40***
N
R2
Adj R2
T.stat
676
0.091
0.051
0.000
676
0.091
0.051
0.000
676
0.098
0.058
0.000
676
0.098
0.058
0.000
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01
See Table 1 for definition of variables.
are positively and insignificantly correlated with ARL 
and IAARL, thereby suggesting that our hypothesis is not 
supported. 
 The result is explained as follows. First, audit 
committees in Malaysia are not given sufficient support 
by the board. It has been reported that boards with a high 
proportion of independent directors and expertise are more 
likely to have a more effective audit committee (Rainsbury 
et al. 2008) but this is not the case. More insights into 
our data reveal that Malaysian boards are dominated by 
executive directors, and that, in most cases, independent 
and financial expert directors on the audit committee are 
the only independent and financial expert directors on 
the board. Second, given their status as a minority on the 
board and the long timeframe requirements for disclosing 
audited reports, these directors are more concerned about 
the accuracy and reliability of accounting numbers than the 
relevancy of these numbers. This is because their reputation 
is more likely to be significantly threatened in cases such 
as accounting numbers manipulation, than it is for timely 
disclosure. Therefore, they might conduct a more detailed 
review and discussion with the internal auditors, CFO and 
CEO. In addition, they might ask the auditor to delay the 
issue of an audit report to further examine whether the 
suggestions of auditors reflect an independent auditor and 
how managers address these suggestions.
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS
BOARD INDEPENDENCE
As we have suggested, audit committee independence 
enhances the role of financial expertise in audit report 
lag and that board independence is considered as a major 
element for ensuring overall effective monitoring. In 
Malaysia, there is evidence indicating that only independent 
directors on the board perform greater monitoring (Ameer 
et al. 2009). Using subsample analysis, we tested equation 
(1) and (2) by grouping our sample into two groups based 
on board independence. According to prior literature (e.g. 
Krishnan & Visvanathan 2008), companies with a board 
independence of 60% and above are considered as having 
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a more independent board (H_BID), whilst companies with 
less than this proportion are considered as having a less 
independent board (L_BID). We conducted all these tests 
using ARL, as it is the measure that is mostly used for audit 
report timeliness and for the purpose of brevity. Furthermore, 
we only considered the proportion of independent directors 
to measure audit committee independence. 
 Table 5 shows the results of this analysis, and 
it indicates that ACAEX and ACID are negatively and 
significantly associated with ARL for boards dominated 
by independent directors. On the other hand, for boards 
with a high proportion of non-independent directors, 
ACAEX is significantly and positively associated with ARL, 
while ACID is insignificantly associated. These results 
suggest that audit committee financial expertise and 
independence are hindered by the lack of independent 
boards in reducing the lag of the audit report. However, 
ACAEX*ACID is positively and insignificantly associated 
with ARL for H_BID (L_BID) group indicating that if the board 
is dominated by independent directors, financial expertise 
director can effectively contribute to short audit report lag 
regardless of the proportion of independent directors in the 
committee. Furthermore, we observed that ACSZ and ACM 
have a significant and negative association with ARL for 
boards with more independent directors, but that they are 
insignificant for boards with fewer independent directors, 
thereby indicating that board independence is crucial to 
ensure the effectiveness of the role of the audit committee 
on the timeliness of audit reports.
COMPANY SUBSIDIARIES
One claim advanced by Bursa Malaysia for reducing the 
timeframe of the audited financial statement (60 days) 
is that the auditors of companies with a large number 
of subsidiaries will face difficulty in complying with 
any reduction in the current timeframe. In most of the 
literature, as well as our empirical evidence, it is suggested 
that companies with a large number of subsidiaries have 
a longer audit report lag. We empirically examined this 
TABLE 5. Additional analysis
Variable ARL RESTMT
H_BID L_BID LNSUB
Coef/ t.stat Coef/ t.stat Coef/ t.stat Coef/ t.stat Coef/ t.stat Coef/ t.stat
ACAEX
ACID
LNSUB
ARL_S
ACAEX*ACID
ACSZ
ACM
BID
BSZ
BOM
FNCOND
OWCO
SUB
INVRCEV
EXTORD
LOSS
COSZ
NEWS
LNCOPAGE
OPINION
ADFSZ
ADFT
ADFEE
NADFEE
-17.385***
-12.215**
-2.829***
-1.127**
1.040
0.515
0.418
-0.291***
0.214**
53.986***
5.272**
-0.321
-0.781
0.0119***
-1.248
8.914***
-1.523
-0.555
2.312**
-0.091
-3.129***
-1.899**
1.472
-2.735***
-1.112*
0.906
0.551
0.338
-0.281***
0.225**
54.049***
4.191
-0.039
-0.764
0.011***
-1.671
8.273***
-1.968
-0.330
2.432**
-0.091
10.429***
-1.822
-1.835
-0.163
0.783
0.084
1.141***
-0.147**
-0.013
-16.140***
3.637**
5.363***
-1.676**
0.004
-13.964**
5.986*
6.233**
0.558***
1.892***
-0.459***
2.002***
-0.299
0.380
-1.878
-0.158
0.749
0.099
1.157***
-0.144**
-0.013
-15.832***
3.565**
5.435***
-1.658**
0.004
-13.943**
6.065*
6.255**
0.569***
2.038***
-0.475***
5.907
-2.908
-1.318
-1.229***
-0.444
1.419
0.174
0.203
0.788***
-0.181***
-
-2.259
4.240***
4.684***
0.827
-0.001
-10.418**
5.972**
5.345**
0.351*
1.363
-0.424***
2.066
-1.040
-0.481
-0.599
0.071
-2.584
0.283
-0.039
0.307
-0.002
0.036*
6.708**
-0.799
-0.101
1.108*
-0.006
2.283
0.474
0.292
-0.204
-1.074
-0.015
YEARDUM Included 
_cons 89.49* 71.769 140.44*** 140.89*** 87.87*** -
R2
T.stat
N 
0.441
0.000
159
0.449
0.000
159
0.106
0.000
517
0.107
0.000
517
0.088
0.000
676
0.187
0.000
399
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01
H_BID is indicator for subsample with high proportion of board independence; L_BID is indicator for subsample with low proportion of board independence; LNSUB is 
indicator variable equals 1 if the number of subsidiaries is equal or greater than sample median, 0 otherwise; ARL_S is indicator variable equals 1 if the ARL is smaller 
than sample median, 0 otherwise; RESTMT is indicator variable equals 1 if the company restates its annual report, 0 otherwise; See Table 1 for definition of other variables.
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claim by creating a dummy variable (LNSUB) that reflects 
companies with a number of subsidiaries equal to or more 
than the median of our sample (25). 
 In Table 5, we provide an estimation of equation (1) 
after replacing SUB with LNSUB, and found that LNSUB 
is insignificantly related to ARL, which suggests that the 
presence of a large number of subsidiaries does not hinder 
the auditors in expressing their opinion more quickly. 
Furthermore, we replaced LNSUB by using the number of 
foreign subsidies and rerun equation (1). The unreported 
results support the preceding conclusion.
SHORT AUDIT REPORT LAG AND QUALITY OF 
FINANCIAL REPORTING
We also tested another claim by Bursa Malaysia in that 
introducing a new reduction relating to the timeframe 
of audited financial statements will threaten the quality 
of these statements. Using US data, Knechel and Sharma 
(2012) showed that short audit report lag is not associated 
with a decrease in the quality of financial reports. 
Accordingly, we tested this claim by using financial 
reporting restatement (RESTMNT) as a proxy for financial 
reporting quality, and companies with an audit report lag 
less than the sample median as a proxy for short audit 
report lag (ARL_S). In our full sample, 18% of companies 
restated their annual financial reports. However, using 
logistic regression for panel data, Table 5 shows that 
ARL_S is negatively and insignificantly associated with 
ARL, thereby indicating that a short audit report lag does 
not lead to lower quality financial reporting.
CONCLUSION
This study is a timely response to the recent requirements 
made by Bursa Malaysia relating to the timeframe for 
disclosure, and to the Malaysian empirical evidence 
relating to the association between audit committee 
financial expertise and audit report lag. We find that 
Malaysian companies are able to provide more timely 
financial reports that are compatible with more developed 
countries, such as the US. Furthermore, we find that audit 
committee financial expertise is not associated with 
audit report lag. Thus, we propose that audit committee 
independence enhances audit committee financial expertise 
in providing timely financial reports. Using the interaction 
approach, we documented the association between audit 
committee financial expertise and independence with audit 
report lag, are either separately or jointly significant.
 Consequently, we explained that these two significant 
monitoring mechanisms receive insufficient support 
from the board of directors. Empirical evidence testing 
this explanation suggests that audit committee financial 
expertise and independence are associated with a short 
audit report lag if the board of directors is dominated 
by independent directors. We also found no empirical 
evidence supporting that a large number of subsidiaries 
hinders the ability of auditors to provide a timely audit 
report, and that reducing the timeframe of audited financial 
reports will dilute the quality of such reports.   
 Our findings suggest crucial implications for the audit 
report timeliness literature and Malaysian policymakers. 
We have contributed to prior literature by examining 
whether the interaction between audit committee financial 
expertise and its independence enhances the timeliness 
of audit reports. With respect to the contribution to the 
Malaysian audit report lag literature, we believe that 
audit committee financial expertise is a relevant factor 
in explaining audit report lag when the effect of board 
independence is included as a contributing factor. As for 
policymakers, we have evidence suggesting that Bursa 
Malaysia regulators have missed an opportunity to further 
enhance the timeliness of financial reporting since a large 
number of companies have an audit report lag of no 
more than 77 days. In addition, our findings support the 
latest reforms in relation to the composition of the audit 
committee, and suggest that Malaysian regulators should 
pay further attention to the composition of the board.
 We acknowledge that our results should be interpreted 
with caution due to some methodological limitations. First, 
the data come from companies of a relatively large size 
in terms of their capitalization. Thus, the generalizability 
of our results is constrained by this limitation. Second, 
although our results are more reliable because we have 
control over most of the variables in the audit report lag 
model and we have considered company and time specific 
effects, this reliability could be threatened if the audit 
report lag is dynamic. Thus, we suggest that future research 
considers these limitations.
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NOTES
1. We did not control the recent findings in relation to 
internal audit function because of the high number 
of missing data for internal audit investment over 
the study period and the fact that the majority of our 
sample has an in-house internal audit function. 
2. We could explain the unexpected results for ADFSZ 
and ADFT as follows: Big 4 audit firms in Malaysia 
are currently exposed to greater reputation and 
financial risks as a result for discovering many cases of 
accounting irregularities in 2007 (e.g. Megan Media, 
Transmile Bhd, Maxbiz Corp Bhd) and establishing 
Audit Oversight Board (AOB) in 2010 for monitoring 
and inspecting audit firms registered in Malaysia. 
Confirming our claim, most Malaysian evidence on 
the association between big 4 audit firms and audit 
report lag that uses data after 2005 have positive or not 
economically significant association (e.g. Ishak, Sidek 
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& Rashid 2010; Ismail et al. 2012; Mohamad-Nor et al. 
2010; Nelson & Shukeri 2011; Yaacob & Che-Ahmad 
2012; Wan-Hussin & Bamahros 2013). Alternatively, 
big 4 audit firms in Malaysia are concerned with the 
quality of reports more than any other type of auditors. 
Therefore, they conduct more detailed audit and exert 
large amount of efforts, which in turn is associated 
with the longer period of time required to complete 
the audit. As for audit firm tenure, it is possible that 
auditors in Malaysia in the initial years are more 
motivated to prove themselves to shareholders as 
efficient in providing timely accounting information, 
but after a few years this motivation decreases as they 
become more powerful or non-independent. 
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